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Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate the apparent existence of two anomalies in the South African 
stock market based on regular strike action, namely the month of the year effect and 
seasonality across specific sectors of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
Table of contents 
1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………7 
1.1 Background……………………………………………………………………………………7 
1.1.1 Initialobservation……………………………………………………………………….9 
Table 1: Variances of dual-listed stock vs. RESI……………………………………………..10 
Table 1.2: Cumulative average variation results less non-mutually exclusive stocks……….10 
1.2 Purpose of the study………………………………………………………………………….11 
1.3 Research questions……………………………………………………………………………12 
1.4 Research hypothesis……………………………………………………………………….13 
1.5  Research objectives………………….……………………………………………………...13 
1.6 Significance of the study…………….…………………………………………………….13 
1.7 Limitations……………………………………………………………………………………13 
2 Literature 
review…………………………………………………………………………ERROR! BOOKMARK 
NOT DEFINED. 
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….15 
2.2 Factors influencing share prices………………………………………………………………15 
 2.2.1 Economic factors…………………………………………………………………….15 
 2.2.2  Political/labour unrest and the stock market…………………………………………18 
2.2.3 Industrial action ................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3 Stock return seasonality ................................................................................................................... 20 
2.4 Investor psychology/sentiment and capital markets ........................................................................ 23 
2.4.1 Psychology .......................................................................................................................... 23 
2.4.2 Sentiment ............................................................................................................................. 23 
2.5 Safe haven theory ............................................................................................................................. 24 
 2.5.1 Research propositions........................................................................................…...25 
2.6 Chapter summary and conclusions………………………………………………………...…26 
3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 28 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 28 
3.2 The vector autoregressive (VAR) model ......................................................................................... 28 
3.3 Data and data source ........................................................................................................................ 29 
3.4 Unit root tests and test for cointegration .......................................................................................... 30 
 3.4.1 Unit root tests………………………………………………………………………30 
 3.4.2 Test for cointegration……………………………………………………………….31 
3.5 The Granger-causality model ........................................................................................................... 31 
3.6 The correlation matrix, impulse response and variance decomposition functions .......................... 32 
5 
 
3.7 Volatility and degression with the ARIMA error……………………………………………....33 
 3.7.1 Volatility modeling……………………………………………………………………33 
 3.7.2 Regression with autoregressive errors……………………………………………..33 
4. Data analysis………………………………………………………………………………………35 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..35 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of monthly stocks and the RESI         …............ .......35 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of monthly returns (rt) using Equation 11…………………………36 
4.2 Descriptive statistics and stationarity results…………………………………………………..35 
4.3 Correlations……………………………………………………………………………………….39 
Table 4.3: Unit root tests…………………………………………………………………………39 
      Table 4.4: Correlation matrix for the monthly stocks…………………………………………….40 
4.4 Interpretation of the Granger-causality results…………………………………………………..40 
Table 4.5: Pairwise Granger-Causality tests………………………………………………………40 
4.5 The estimated VAR model……………………………………………………………………….41 
 4.5.1 The VAR estimates…………………………………………………………………….41 
 4.5.2 Impulse response functions…………………………………………………………….41 
4.6 Monthly seasonality of stock returns………………………………………………………….42 
 4.6.1 Results from the time series regressions……………………………………………..42 
Table 4.6: Monthly seasonality of stock returns …………………………………………..43 
Table 4.7: Monthly seasonality of stock returns in mean and volatility…………………….44 
4.6.2 Time series decomposition…………………………………………………………..45 
5. Interpretation and further study…………………………………………………………………48 
 5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..48 
5.2 Further research………………………………………………………………………….48 
Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………..……50 
1. Time series plotsof stocks and logarithmic returns………………………………………..……..51 
 1.1 Times series plots of raw data…………………………………………………………..51 
 1.2 Times series plots of return series ………………………………………………………..51 
2. VAR models - vector autoregression estimates………………………………………………….52 
3. Impulse response functions…………………………………………………………………….53 
4. Pairwise Granger-causality tests………………………………………………………………...55 
5. Residuals for VAR model………………………………………………………………………….57 
6. Plots of the seasonal indices……………………………………………………………………58 
 6.1 Plot of the seasonal indices of CFR stock……………………………………………..58 
 6.2 Plot of the seasonal indices of SBK stock…………………………………………….58 
 6.3 Plot of the seasonal indices of SAB stock………………………………………………59 
 6.4 Plot of the seasonal indices of NPN stock……………………………………………..60 
6 
 
 6.5 Plot of the seasonal indices of FSR stock……………………………………………….60 
7.  Topic index tables……………………………………………………………………………….61 
 7.1 Constituents of the Top 40 index………………………………………………………..61 
 7.2 Constituents of the RESI index…………………………………………………………61 
8. Volume of mining products (base 2010=100)…………………………………………………..62 
References…………………………………………………………………………………………….65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
This paper investigates the apparent existence of two anomalies in the South African stock 
market based on regular strike action, namely the month of the year effect and seasonality 
across specific sectors of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. If these anomalies are found to 
be real, this would violate a fundamental pillar of finance theory– the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) states that asset prices fully reflect all 
available information and that past priceinformation should allow for no prediction of future 
prices (Fama and French, 1988). The EMH is predicated on the Random Walk Theory,which 
postulates that future asset price changes cannot be predicted based on previous information 
and are indeed random.This study is inspired bypersonal observations as anequity stock and 
derivativestrader: each year at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, it appears that fundsflow 
from theJohannesburg Stock Exchange’s Resource Index(referred to as the RESI henceforth) 
intodual-listed stocks ahead of the anticipated South African strike season, namely from 
March onwards.As evidence of this, most bargaining council negotiations start in March and 
utilise industrial action as a means of leverage in these talks. In past years,industrial 
discussions have started in March but there is a notedincreasing impetus from unions to start 
negotiations earlier on in the year. Appendix 8, referenced from Statistics South Africa’s 
Mining, Sales and Production review (2014), clearly graphs that from 2009 to 2012, mining 
production started declining from March onwards due to industrial action. They also note that 
the largest strike to hit the platinum mining sector ever started on 23 January 2014, resulting 
in a negative 6.5% loss in production year on year as of May 2014.The graph based on 
Statistics South Africa’s industrial action analysis tracker clearly shows industrial action 
starting much earlier than in previous years. TheJohannesburg Stock Exchange RESI is 
constituted by the 10 largest resources shares by rand market capitalisation. 
 
This paper has not investigated strike causality directly on share prices but ratherviewed it as 
an impetus to influence investor sentiment, and thus instead looked at why shares are bought 
and sold during this period, both pre-emptively and during the periods mentioned.Strike 
season is well known to South African investors and it would be expected that this seasonal 
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pattern would be priced into securities ahead of strike season, but research by the likes of 
Becker and Olson (1986) show that this is not always the case. 
 
The Annual Industrial Action Report (2013), published by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), presents the results of strike activities from January 2012 to December 2012. 
Overall, the year 2012 showed a comparably high increase when compared to the previous 
four years. A total of 99 strike incidents were recorded in 2012.There were 67 recorded 
strikes in 2011 and 74 in 2010. Going further back, there were 51 in 2009 and 57 in 2008. 
As a result of these strikes, the working days lost were 3 309 884 in 2012 (with 241 391 
employees) as compared to 2806 656 in 2011 (with 203 138 employees).In addition, R6.7 
billion was lost in 2012 in terms of wages, compared to R1.1 billion in 2011. More worrying 
is that 44% of strikes in 2012 were wildcat and thus unprotected, with 57.5% of total 
workers involved in the labour unrest from the mining sector where a wave of wildcat action 
was observed. Wildcat strikes are those where the striking takes place without permission or 
prior consent and are known for their documented violent nature in comparison to 
sanctioned strikes. The mining sector lost the most working days due to this strike action 
(82.4%), followed by the manufacturing (5.7%), community (4.1%) and agriculture (3.7%) 
sectors in 2012.The Annual Industrial Action Report (2013) shows that there has been an 
increase of 15.1% from 2012 to 2013 in terms of strikes recorded. The mining sector 
continued to be the most affected industry, with 515 971 days lost due to these strikes. 
 
The mining sector is the primary sector for the focus of this research, in terms of the share 
price variations of constituent companies. The sector comprises resource shares, which are 
diversified across the various minerals and oils that amount to 50% of our export economy, 
as noted by Statistics South Africa (2014). These companies specialise in mining 
variousmineralsand provide coal, iron ore, copper, oils and their synthetic counterparts, 
characterised by Sasol Pty (SOL code on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). Platinum was 
heavily hit by the 2014 strike actionand can be characterised by Anglo Platinum Pty (AMS- 
short code on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). Gold can be characterised by Anglo 
American Pty (AGL -short code on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) 
 
Preliminary data supporting these observations ispresented in the discussion that follows. 
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1.1.1 Initial observation 
 
Theinitial investigation to ascertain the possibility ofa relationship between month of the year 
effects and if there were any apparent seasonal movements between different stock 
sectorsisshown in Table 1. From the tables included, it is clear thatthe data points to there 
being a definite month of the year effect and indeed seasonal movements instocks sectors that 
warrants deeper investigation. Theinitial investigation was structured asfollows:The first step 
was tocreate an index based on the nine biggest dual-listed stocks by rand value market 
capitalisation. Thesenine specific stocks were chosen as they had sufficient data required for 
the research, as they had all been listed for at least 10 years. They were also the largest by 
rand market capitalisation and thus the big names in the mining industry, therefore the most 
targeted by labour unions for remuneration increases to workers. Their average monthly 
variation figures for 2013 were compared to The Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s RESI  to 
determine whether initial data showed any consistency with the hypothesis that come strike 
season (pre-emptively April/May), investment funds flow out of the RESI Index and its 
constituents and into “safe haven assets”, namely dual-listed (or rand hedge) stocks. 
 
The RESI comprises mining and resource stocks which, in theory, should all decline when 
industrial action starts. 
 
Rand hedge stocks can be defined as companies listed on at leasttwo exchanges, at least one 
of which must be outside of South Africa. They must also incur a large proportion of their 
costs in South African rand,the bulk of whose revenue are denominated in foreign currency, 
such as U.S. dollars. Barrand Kantor(2005) go a step further and distinguish between rand 
hedge, rand leverage and pure randplay stocks.Barrand Kantor(2005) further expand by 
saying that rand hedge stocks have mostly U.S.dollar revenues and dollar costs. Rand 
leverage refers to companies with dollar revenues and rand costs, whilerand play stocks have 
most of their costs and revenues in rand value. The authors also state that few companies fall 
neatly into a specific category as most South African conglomerates have a mix of local and 
foreign assets. This definition of incurring the bulk of costs in South African Rand (ZAR) and 
generating the bulk of revenues in dollars/foreign currency will thus be used in the rest of this 
study. Table A1, contained in the appendices, shows the make-up of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange’s Top 40 Index and how it is largely resource based. Table A2, contained in the 
appendices, shows the make-up of the Resource Index 10 (RESI). Table1 represents data on 
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the monthly changes in the value of dual-listed stocks and the resource index for the period 
2013. 
 
Table 1: Variances of dual-listed stock vs. RESI 
 
Monthly averaged data was used.The index starts at zero for the sake of clear movements 
from the baseline index, set at 0. Red signifies negative cumulative average variation, whilst 
black represents positive cumulative average variation. One year was chosen as an initial 
assessment of the initial theory, to see if it warranted deeper investigation. As 2013 was very 
labour dispute intensive, it is a prime year to test for patterns in stock movement and would 
warrant researching deeper into the last 10 years if significant evidence of patterns emerged 
from this initial research. 
 
Table 1.2 : Cumulativeaverage variation results less non-mutually exclusive stocks 
 
Mutual stocks found in both indices have beenremoved for ease of reference.The table shows 
that when mutual stocks found in both indices are removed and there is thus no duality of 
data as mutual stocks such as Anglo American, BHP Billiton and Sasol have been eliminated 
from this paper, the returns are almost inversely correlated.This could indicate a direct flow 
from one JSE sector into another JSE sector.These stocks were removedwhen looking at 
movements, because they belong in both categories and thus investors might want to hold 
their positions in these stocks and trade the non-mutual stocks to exploit the rand hedge play. 
With these mutual stocks removed, you see an almost 1-to-1 inverse correlation(+21% vs -
Stock Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec CUM %
Anglo American plc 0 0.032293 -0.08563 -0.18234 0.107898 -0.01272 -0.0412 -0.03901 0.017812 0.019505 -0.03382 0.026649 -19.0560%
BHP Billiton plc 0 -0.01671 -0.06424 -0.13341 0.183321 -0.04937 0.058477 0.074032 -0.12125 0.295896 -0.04214 -0.18424 0.0346%
British American Tob plc 0 0.012993 0.022716 -0.11308 0.231535 -0.02088 0.099707 0.018679 -0.16156 0.266609 -0.03695 -0.18522 13.4543%
Compagnie Fin Richemont 0 0.036145 0.040868 -0.12283 0.22926 -0.0962 0.012531 0.139012 -0.09851 0.258076 0.083316 -0.11259 36.9083%
Firstrand Ltd 0 0.054439 0.039897 -0.14266 0.296087 0.002347 0.059989 0.029887 -0.16032 0.228647 0.028522 -0.16101 27.5820%
Naspers Ltd -N- 0 0.071912 0.047012 -0.06767 0.222144 -0.04057 0.02977 0.074395 -0.11358 0.329799 -0.03481 -0.18836 33.0031%
SABMiller plc 0 0.046307 0.016796 -0.11089 0.214252 -0.03957 0.119015 0.062585 -0.13936 0.235237 -0.01985 -0.15779 22.6727%
Sasol Limited 0 0.007187 -0.043 -0.1785 0.192941 -0.04429 0.001664 0.031346 -0.08702 0.214795 -0.04507 -0.20618 -15.6130%
Standard Bank Group Ltd 0 0.058638 0.01156 -0.13058 0.246818 -0.04355 0.029358 0.010265 -0.19028 0.192873 -0.02707 -0.18618 -2.8149%
Resource 10 0 -0.0003 -0.07048 -0.17111 0.184627 -0.04125 0.008795 0.0274 -0.11936 0.252653 -0.0524 -0.21116 -19.2578%
Variations in Index Levels
Other 6 dual-listed stocks 21.8009% 
Resource 10 -19.2578% 
Performance 2013 
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19). Information is widely available to all investors, but the potential for these movements to 
have been actioned by sentiment can not be removed, whether rational or not. 
 
Correlation: 
A correlation exercise with these seven assets was run. These were the results as computed by 
Microsoft Excel: 
Table 2: 
  BTI CFR FSR NPN SAB SBK RESI 
BTI 1             
CFR 0.959792 1           
FSR 0.934194 0.910183 1         
NPN 0.913511 0.910606 0.760651 1       
SAB 0.959622 0.945839 0.909113 0.9626 1     
SBK 0.68591 0.656168 0.43229 0.773685 0.673074 1   
RESI 0.619055 0.646032 0.613805 0.502413 0.509226 0.66891 1 
 
As Table 2 shows, a number of these stocks have high correlation coefficients.1 shows 
perfect positive correlations as shown by BTI against BTI, equaling 1. A number of these 
stocks have correlations above 0.75, showing high positive correlation and may indicate a 
joint sector-based movement due to investor action, indicated in green. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study wasto investigate the existence of any month of the year effects on 
the JSE, specifically with regards to the RESI.Any effects may cause investmentRands to be 
moved from these resource/mineral and mining stocks into other stock sectors, such as the 
dual-listed sector. Muzenda (2012) replicated the work of Jegadeesh (1990) in the South 
African context. Muzenda(2012) tested individual stocks and twoportfolios comprised via 
return and market capitalisation, only to find thatthis method did notreliably predict returns 
on these stocks or portfolios. Darrat, Bin and Chung (2013) found no evidence of a “January” 
or “December” effect, but did find evidence of a “day of the week” effect, with Mondays and 
Tuesdays delivering significantly lower returns than on their benchmark of 
Wednesday.Alagidede (2012) found significantly higher returns in stocks preceding holidays 
and that month of the year effects are indeed present in African stock markets. 
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Ngidi (2011) states that the market reacts negatively from five days prior to an announced 
strike and continues on a downward trajectory up to five days post-strike. Persons (1995) 
conducted a detailed review on the effect of automobile strikes on the stock value of steel 
suppliers in the U.S. for the period 1965-1990. He stated that on announcement of automobile 
strikes, steel suppliers experienced statistically significant negative returns, about equal to the 
negative returns experienced by the actual automobile manufacturers. He concluded that 
researchers and policy-makers evaluating the private and social costs of strikes should 
consider the effects on the profitability of the stock of the strike-affectedindustries,as well as 
of the linked industries.  
 
There has been a fair deal of research conducted on the South African stock market but there 
is a research gap as.While all the available research addresses seasonality across the entire 
JSE, it does not address seasonality or causality across indexes or categories of stock sectors. 
This is the gap this paper aims to address, as well as to substantiate whether there is 
seasonality/causality present across stock sectors, and whether this provides an above-market 
return opportunity for investors. 
 
1.3 Researchquestions 
1. Arethere seasonal changes in the RESIthat provide arbitrage opportunities, which might 
be exploited by stock investors? 
2. Arethere seasonalchanges in rand hedge stocksthat provide arbitrage opportunities, which 
might be exploited by stock investors? 
3. Is there a relationshipbetween changes in the RESI and the changes in rand hedge stocks? 
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1.4 Researchhypothesis 
 
𝐻0
1: Returns on rand hedge stocks do not possess seasonal characteristics that may be 
exploited by investors 
𝐻0
2: Returns on stocks in the RESI do not possess seasonal characteristics that may be 
exploited by investors 
 
1.5Research objectives 
 
1. To determine whether there are month of the year effects on South African stocks.  
2. To test for possiblerelationships betweentwo sectors of the South African stock 
market,namely the resource sector (with the RESI used as proxy) and the dual-listed rand 
hedge sector,comprising the nine stocks used in these tests. 
1.6 Significance of study 
This study will be highly beneficial to all stakeholders in the South African economy. It will 
benefit anyone investing in the local South African economy, either in equity or equity 
derivatives as it may prove or disprove the widelyknownrand hedgeasset safe haven 
hypothesis.It will also be beneficial to any short-term traders looking to profit from 
seasonality between different JSE stock sectors. 
 
1.7 Limitations 
 
A limitation is the effect of a volatile rand on the price of stocks, with a weakening rand also 
contributing to pushing up the price of rand hedge/dual-listed stocks (not entirely pure dollar 
income vs.dollar expenditure). This is because they pay their costs in rands but their exported 
goods get paid indollars, which means that a weaker rand results in more profits for them.  
 
All of the above, namely investor action driven by sentiment and movements in the rand 
(listed as ZAR),mayin fact be caused by perceived negativity over strikes, but falls out of the 
scope of this study. It may well be a topic for further research. 
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Outline of the study 
 
Aliterature reviewis conducted in the second chapter of this research. The literature review 
will be basedon journal articles, theses and papers covering existing work in this area of 
research. The third section will contain the research methodology used to analyse the data set 
and the information surrounding the hypothesis test. Results will be disclosed in the fourth 
chapter, with the fifth chapter comprising a conclusion drawn from the research results, as 
well as suggestions for how this research can be furthered in the future in the fifth chapter. 
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2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
All material issues that have been proven tobe foundational with regards toaffecting shares 
prices have been included, as well as reviews on literature with specificattention on this 
study’sarea of focus. As mentioned regarding purpose of the study, there is no direct research 
on seasonality and causality between sectors on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as of time 
of submitting this paper. The concepts and components of factors causing seasonality and 
causality will then be discussed in order to highlight the focused area of this research. 
 
2.2 Factors influencing share prices 
 
 2.2.1 Economic factors 
Gruber (1966) states that the price of a share should be equal to the present value of a stream 
of future benefits, discounted at a rate thatreflects both the stockholder’s time preference and 
attitude towards risk. Benefits are future dividends, whilst the operating characteristics of the 
firm, financial structure, size and time path of dividends all affect the rate at which the stock 
would be discounted. Gruber (1966) found that the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
fundamental valuation technique was successful in explaining an average of 87.5% of the 
variation of yearly stock prices. This leaves a substantial portion unaccounted for. The study 
concluded that (a) a rise in stock prices was usually accompanied by an increase in the stock 
holder’s time horizon, as evidenced by the increased importance of growth, operating risk, 
financial risk and size, and the decreased importance of dividends; (b) that a fall in stock 
prices was usually accompanied by a decrease in the stockholder’s horizon; and (c) that the 
stockholder’s time horizon increased over the entire period. 
 
Abdullah and Hayworth (1993) investigated the macro-economic factors affecting stock 
prices and found that stock returns are positively related to inflation and money growth and 
negatively to budget deficits, trade deficits and both short- and long-term interest rates. They 
further state that these factors, along with output growth and lagged information, account for 
substantial proportions of the forecast error variance of stock prices. 
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Timmermann (1993) focused on how learning creates excess volatility and predictability in 
stock prices and found that learning affected predictability of excess returns and the excess 
volatility of stock prices. Estimation uncertainty may therefore increase the volatility of stock 
prices andthe estimation of dividends growth lower than the ‘true’ value tends to increase 
dividend yields and capital gains. A key factor in the valuation of stock prices relates to 
parameters used in the dividend estimation process. Timmermann(1993) states that in a 
Rational Expectation model (RE), stock prices are proportional to dividends and so a 
dividend shock will be reflected in a proportional shock to the stock price.Learning also 
implies an additional effect on stock prices, as the estimated growth rate of dividends is also 
influenced by the dividend shock. Volatility may arise when stocks are valued by dividend 
growth rates different to their true dividend growth rates (estimation uncertainty). Analysts 
may thus have different valuations for stocks and traders may buy or sell stock based on these 
valuations, further fuelling volatility. 
 
Gallagher and Taylor (2002) investigated the interaction between macro-economic shocks 
and stock price movements by investigating temporary and permanent aspects of these 
shocks. This study built on the initial work of Fama and French (1988), which investigated 
the mean reverting nature of stocks. Fama and French (1988) state that U.S. stock prices 
contain a slowly decaying temporary component and induce returns characterised by a large 
negative autocorrelation process for long return horizons of several years. Fama and French 
(1988) further showed that between 25% and 45% of the variation of three to five years 
stocks researched, appear to be predictable from past returns. Gallagher and Taylor (2002) 
showed that aggregate demand shocks had a temporary effect on stock prices, whilst supply 
side shocks may affect the real stock price permanently. They further allude to the market 
value of stocks deviating from theirfundamental value but reverting to their mean as non- 
random walks. This takes into account noise trading, fads and speculative bubbles.  
 
Adrangi, Chatrath and Todd (1999) investigated the relationship between stock returns and 
the inflation rate in industrialised economies. They built on the proxy effect cited by Fama 
and French (1988), which states two propositions. Proposition A states that contrary to the 
suggestion of the Phillips curve, there is a negative relationship between inflation and real 
economic activity. Proposition B states that stock returns are directly related to real economic 
activity. 
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Adrangi,Chatrath and Todd (1999) state that the negative relationship between real stock 
returns and inflation rate persists even after the negative relationship between inflation and 
real activity is purged. They conclude that real stock price may be adversely affected by 
inflation because inflationary pressures may threaten future corporate profits, and that 
nominal discount rates rise under inflationary pressures, reducing the current value of future 
profits and thus stock returns. A key point is that the research put forth by Adrangi,Chatrath 
and Todd(1999) points to supporting the proxy effect in the long run but not in the short term. 
 
Furthermore,Balcilar (2004) addresses long-term memory persistence inflation. He found that 
numerous countries have experienced very long periods ofinflation and that the inflation 
reproduces itself in the absence of new shocks. For example, the inflation process in Turkey 
was found to be highly persistent and the feedback mechanism was so strong that current 
supply shocks such as oil price hikes automatically translated into permanent increases in the 
rate of inflation. Monetary and fiscal policies failed to curb this inflation because inertia had 
rendered it unresponsive to demand. This supports the findings of Adrangi, Chatrath and 
Todd(1999) as well asFama and French (1998), in that it shows that inflation negatively 
affects real activity and thus negatively affects stock prices. 
 
Pearce and Roley (1985) investigated the effect of news on stock prices, particularly 
regarding the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Producer Price Index (PPI) and the Federal 
Reserve’s discount rate. They concluded that new information related to monetary 
policy/supply directly affects stock prices. In particular, money announcement surprises have 
a significant negative effect on stock prices. PPI announcements were found to have 
significant effects (whether positive or negative) on the day but these faded in one week. The 
researchers also concluded that anticipated components of economic announcements had no 
significant impact on stock prices because these would have already been priced into the 
stock. 
 
All of the above-mentioned factors are seminal work in the area of stock price valuations and 
share price prediction. These are largely technical issues with regard to valuations and macro-
economic with regard to over-arching impact on share price. Mentioning the above authors 
puts into perspective the amount of literature in existence when trying to understand, track 
and predict share pricemovements. The above body of work shows that macro-economic 
determinants can be used to predict themajority of a stock’s movement but not its entire 
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movement, as the debate between random walk theory and whether stocks are mean reverting 
continues. This alludes to the fact that even with all the available science and literature,and 
while stocks are to a large degree predictable, a big margin of variationexists for them to 
move, thus rendering prediction difficult.The remaining portion that affects a stock’s 
movement must be made up of soft,non-macro-economic factorslike behavioural finance, 
mentioned below such as investor sentiment, as well as further issues, which also follow 
below. 
 
2.2.2 Politics/labour unrest and the stock market 
AsteriouandSiriopolous (2000) found a significantly negative relationship between socio–
economic uncertainty and economic growth. In another paper, Asteriouand Price (2000) 
delved deeper into this topic, stating that political instability encompasses governments, 
regimes such as trade unions and communities within a nation. They assert that socio-
political instability has two effects, namely of creating uncertainty concerning the political 
and legal environment and secondly of disrupting market activities and labour relations, 
resulting in significant adverse effects on production. They state that this instability will 
reduce the available factors of production and subsequent investment of physical capital will 
be affected. 
 
Beaulieu and Cosset (2005) investigated the topic of political risk on the volatility of stock 
returns.They found that unfavourable news of political risk had a more significant impact on 
stock price returns than did positive news. They also show that stock return volatility varies 
with a firm’s exposure to political risk, structure of assets and the extent of foreign 
involvement. A sovereign nation’s risk profile will affect its probability of default, credit 
rating and spreads as well as capital flight to and from that country. Furthermore, political 
instability often leads to depreciation of that country’s currency. All of these factors directly 
influence investor confidence of the stocks listed in those countries and subsequently affect 
their actions. 
 
2.2.3 Industrial action 
Phang(2004) quotes the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), stating that there are 
significant economic costs related to industrial relation events such as strikes, slow-downs or 
work stoppages. Evidence from factors such as firm level measures of output and output per 
worker is strong in this regard. Phang (2004)investigated the effect of unrest at Caterpillar 
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during 1999, between Caterpillar and the United Auto Workers Union (UAW). This research 
found that product quality is linked to effort and Phang(2004) concluded that the temporal 
patterns of resale prices, appraisal reports, resale rates and list prices for equipment all 
declined. He addsthat pieces of equipment produced in facilities undergoing unrest were 
resold more often, received worse appraisal reports and had lower list prices. Furthermore, 
equipment produced in the entire U.S. during the dispute period were discounted by 5%, 
which can be attributed to a reduction in salvage value, reduced productivity of the 
equipment or increased operating expenses. 
 
Dinardo and Hallock (2002) investigated the impact of strikes on financial markets for the 
period 1925 to1937. They mentionthat news generated by typical strikes seems to register in 
share prices very early in the strike, but that there were also fairly large stock price reactions 
to news only fully revealed at the end of the strike. They conclude that longer strikes, violent 
strikes, strikes won by unions, strikes leading to union recognition, industry-wide strikes and 
strikes leading to wage increases affected industry stock prices more than strikes with other 
characteristics. 
 
Linked to this, Davidson, Worrell and Garrison, (1988) put forward that the market reacts 
negatively and significantly to a strike’s onset and positively but statically insignificantly to a 
strike’s end. Becker and Olson (1986) further discuss howthe market consistently 
underestimates the effects of strikes in the pre-strike period. This is evidenced by the fact that 
two thirds of the total decline in returns occurs after the announcement of strikes. Davidson, 
Worrell and Garrison, (1988) concludethat there appears to be a permanent loss to the 
shareholders of companies that experience strikes. 
 
Britt and Galle (1974) investigated the structural components of a strike. They found the 
concentration of workers and degree of unionisation to be twokey factors affecting the 
structure of strikes.More heavily unionised industries tend to be characterised by broader, 
shorter and more frequent strikes. They also observed that breadth and duration are critical 
determinants of strike shape and that effective strike shape does not change as the union 
becomes larger. The probability of a strike does increase as the union becomes larger, in 
thatlarger unions have access to larger funds, thus affecting the probability of a strike 
occurring. 
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In the local context, themost accurate source of industrial action-related data is the 
Department of Labour’s annual Industrial Action Report. The 2013 edition summarises the 
past four years and notes the increase of industrial action, citing 51 incidents in 2009, 74 in 
2010, 67 in 2011, 99 in 2012 and 114 recorded in 2013.It notes an increase in wages lost in 
2013 amounting to 6.7 billion rand, up from 6.6 billion rand in 2012, with the average wage 
increase at 8%, a level above inflation. Added to this, the South African Transport and Allied 
workers Union (SATAWU) and National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) had the biggest 
participation strike rate of members and, due to sheer volume size, were able to negotiate a 
25.7% and 17.4% wage increase respectively. The Departmentelaborates on this by stating 
that low wages, rising inequality and tough economic conditions had led analysts to predict 
toughnegotiations in 2013. This was also influenced by above-average wage increases 
granted in 2012. It was found that the mining, manufacturing and community industries were 
hardest hit, case in point being the manufacturing industry, which contracted 6.6%, forcing 
car giant producer BMW to stop its expansion projects in South Africa and look for new 
manufacturing locations overseas. There’s a 25% unemployment rate in the mining, 
manufacturing and community sectors, which is set to continue to negatively affect the 
economy in the next two to three years.  
 
The above literature reviewed on industrial action is of vital focus for this research,as it 
shows the widely known extent of the negativemacro-economic result of industrial action in 
South Africa. Industrial action has been proven to be increasing in both duration as well as 
volume of incidents, thus increasing the negative spill over into production costs for mining 
firms. Savvy investors would be cognisant of the data and act to find a way to benefit from 
this. Interestingly, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis states that an efficient market would 
render this information useless.This conversely raises the issue of whether investors are 
indeed able to find a way to benefit from this yearly cycle of strike action and if seasonality 
does in fact exist. 
 
2.3Stock return seasonality 
 
Beaulieu and Cosset (2005) investigated the topic of political/event risk on the volatility of 
stock returns. They found that unfavourable political risk news had a more significant impact 
on stock price returns than did positive news. This researchwill not investigate the causality 
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of mining unrest on indexes but rather focus on proving or disproving whetherstock return 
seasonality does in fact exist in different South African sectors. 
 
Corhayand Hawaini (1987) found that there is seasonality in risk premiums of stocks across 
the U.S., France, the U.K. and Belgium. This in turn influenced portfolio returns, which can 
be attributed to an increase or decrease in consumer appetite for these risk and reward levels.  
This builds on the work of Gultekin and Gultekin (1983), which observed this same 
phenomenon in multiple stock exchanges around the world. Patton and Verardo (2012) 
further expanded this concept by stating that betas increase on earnings announcement days 
and revert to their average levels two to five days later. They also foundthat the increase in 
betas is greater for announcements that have larger positive or negative surprises. 
 
Furthermore, Heston and Sadka (2010) assertthat stocks that outperform the domestic market 
in a particular month continue to outperform the domestic market in that same calendar 
month for up to four years. They also notethat global trading strategies based on seasonal 
predictability outperform similar non-seasonal strategies by over 1% per month. They found 
thatthese abnormal seasonal returns persist even after controlling for size, betas and value. 
 
Saad (2004) further emphasised this by investigating seasonality in the Kuwait stock market. 
Kuwait has no taxation and thus new factors must be considered as the taxation effect is 
normally attributed to seasonal effects on stocks. This expands the work of Wachtel (1942) 
who first observed seasonality on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). He observed 
bullish tendencies from December to January for 11 of the 15 years studied,and  attributes 
this to year-end tax-loss selling. The tax-loss selling hypothesis is that Capital Gains Taxation 
incentivises investors to realise losses at the end of the year and this puts downward pressure 
on these stocks that are sold. This downward pressure passes with the coming of a new tax 
year and these over-sold stocks rebound, causing high returns in January, known as the 
January effect. 
 
Saad (2004) also picked up seasonality in the absence of taxation in Kuwait. July seasonality 
was detected in his research. He attributed this to August being holidayseason (Ramadan) in 
Kuwait, with investors investing idle cash and rebalancing their portfolios during July. 
Husain (1998) also investigates the seasonal effect of Ramadan. People are well aware of this 
annual event but seasonal effects still persist. Seasonality is evident not so much in reduced 
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returns but more so in reduced volatility attributed to investors taking less risky 
gambles/trades during this holy month. Husain (1998) posits that investors may benefit 
during this known time period from the reduction in volatility. Savvy investors may well 
change their strategies during this time period to benefit from a more predictable set of 
returns by moving funds to more risky or less risky investments for this time period, 
depending on their risk appetite. These investments may be more risky, but this seasonal 
effect renders them more predictable and less volatile. Investors may then switch out of these 
investments at the end of Ramadan. 
 
PerHylleberg(1992), seasonality is the systematic,although not necessarily regular,intra-year 
movement caused by the changes of the weather, the calendar, and timing of decisions, 
directly or indirectly through the production and consumptions decisions made by the agents 
of the economy. These decisions are influenced by endowments, the expectations and 
preferences of the agents and the production techniques available in the economy.Granger 
(1979) wrote the seminal work on seasonality, definingfour distinct classes of seasonality, 
namely: 
 
Calendar:Certain public holidays, such as Christmas and Easter, affect data related to 
productions. The number of monthly working days may affect flow variables, such as imports 
and productions. 
 
Timing of decisions: Seemingly uneconomically related events, such as school holidays, 
company dividends payments dates andtax year-end all cause seasonal affects as they occur 
at the same time every year. They are very deterministic and cause pronounced seasonal 
components, such as employment rates. 
 
Weather: Actual changes in temperature, rainfall rate and the like have direct effects on 
agricultural production, construction and transportation and can directly affect the economy. 
 
Expectation: Expectation can lead to plans that in go on to cause seasonality and perpetuate 
seasonality, such as with seasonal holidays. 
 
Deterministic seasonality is defined as when the “process started”. The opposite of the 
deterministic approach is the seasonal random walk model. This poses that the seasonal cycle 
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is persistent but also changes persistently, variance is thus increasing and the process is 
therefore not stationary. 
 
2.4 Investor psychology/sentiment and capital markets 
 
2.4.1 Psychology 
Alter and Oppenheimer (2006) address a psychological factor pertaining to stock prices. They 
address fluency, which is that people tend to prefer easily processed information, implying 
that simple cognitive approaches to modelling human behaviour sometimes outperform more 
typical, complex alternatives such as valuations. This is of potential benefit in that itshows 
investors like to stick to what they know and may in fact cause them to follow seasonal 
patterns to their trading strategies. In an event with negative ramifications for a stock, such as 
an insider trading scandal or strike, analysts may be able to predict where investor funds may 
flow to from the affected company.Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) states that investor expectations 
about future market returns depend strongly on the investor’s own investment experience and 
that the expectation of certain variables does affect portfolio choice.The dependence of 
beliefs on own experience remains strong for high wealth investors, suggesting that 
information costs are not a likely explanation. 
 
2.4.2 Sentiment 
SrivastavaandRao (2014) showjust how important the concept of sentiment is in the modern 
economy. We have more information readilyavailable at a second’s notice through various 
conventional financial systems, such as Bloomberg and Reuters, and new age social media, 
such as Facebook and Twitter. Srivastava and Rao(2014) focus on the impact of social 
mediaplatforms on stock markets. They note that there is growing interest from trading firms 
and hedge funds in mining social media to gauge public opinion to drive investment 
decisions. Never has there been a time when information has been so easily available, with 
people able to make and execute investment/trading decisions in seconds. 
Although the speed of sentiment-related activity has changed, this concept is not new. 
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003),wrote the boldly titledWinter Blues: A Sad Stock Market 
Cycle. Thisis a foundational paper in the field of psychology affecting investor behaviour. In 
particular, they investigated the effects of Seasonal Affect Disorder (SAD). SAD is a well-
researched medical disorder, which proves that people’s happiness (depression) levels are 
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influenced by the shortness of days and exposure to sunlight. They proved that SAD levels 
were higher at higher latitude levels where the days are shorter and thus exposure to sunlight 
is lessened, causing depression. Depression results in symptoms such as trouble 
concentrating, loss of interest in sexual activity, social withdrawal, loss of sleep and weight 
gain. They proved that this depression of mood leads to risk aversion in investors. They 
observed unusually low investor returns before the winter solstice and higher returns 
following it. 
 
Bakerand Wurgler(2006)go a step further and examine investor sentiment on different classes 
of stocks. They state that some stocks are more vulnerable to speculation, which could in turn 
result in investor action not in line with fundamentals and allow for arbitrage opportunities. A 
key concept is that vulnerable stock has highly subjective valuations. They state that concepts 
such as earnings, age of the company and dividends open up the stock to speculation from 
investors with higher risk appetites, who will either buy or sell these stocks in line with their 
sentiment-based view of future performance. 
 
Cochrane (2003)considers that sentiment causes people to hold their money in stocks, as 
opposed to currency. Cochrane (2003) noted that IPOs were happening at regular intervals, 
with stock prices rising rapidly after their listing. These stocks were all over-valued and 
eventually caused the ‘dotcom’ bubble to burst. 
 
In fact, sentiment plays such a great role that it has become an indicator of fear. The Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) has become the benchmark for sentiment in 
terms of whether people are fearful to invest or not. It measures the 30-day stock market 
volatility of the S&P 500 Index’s implied expectations. It is based on index points – the 
higher the number, the higher the perceivedvolatility, which in turn is perceived as fear and 
affects investor behaviour. 
 
Sentiment has been established to be a real and proven motivator of investor behaviour and 
its impact on the South African economy cannot be discounted when you take into 
consideration the highly violent and proficient nature of our industrial action season. 
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2.5Safe haven theory 
 
Bauer and McDermott (2010) confirmed that gold is seen as the standard medium or asset by 
investors, acting both as a hedge and as a safe haven asset. A hedge is defined as an asset that 
is negatively correlated with another asset or portfolio. Safe haven then is defined as an asset 
that is negatively correlated with an asset or portfolio in certain periods. The distinguishing 
feature of these two definitionsis the length of time covered. In another paper, this time by 
Bauer and Lucey (2010), they make the case that gold is a safe haven asset for stocks for only 
15 days after an extremely negative shock. 
 
They also note that a hedge can co-move with stocks in negative periods due to herd 
behaviour or contagion versus safe haven assets, which always hold their value. They found 
this to be more strongly correlated to U.S. and European markets and that gold acts as a 
stabilising force for the economy by reducing losses in the face of extremely negative market 
shocks. Since the financial crash of late 2007/2008,the price of gold had risen 42%. They go 
on to define a safe haven asset as an asset that holds its value in the face of adverse markets 
conditions. This phenomenon is usually experienced on a short-term basis as the investor 
seeks to protecthis or her wealth when unexpected negative shocks arise and then switches 
out when markets conditions return to normal. Theresearch, however, points to gold not been 
proven to be econometrically significant as a safe haven asset in emerging markets like South 
Africa. Gold is seen as a universal hedge except in emerging markets, thus proving that 
personal trader observations about rand hedge stocks used as hedges does merit investigation 
if gold is proven not to be the benchmark hedge in South Africa. 
 
Ciner,Gurdgiev andLucey(2013) explore work in the field of safe haven assets from a 
behavioural analysis viewpoint, in discussing investors making decisions under risk. 
Theystate that investors will exhibit extreme loss aversion in exceptional circumstances and 
move quickly between assets to minimiselosses. Thisadds rationale to why safe haven assets 
only comeinto play in extremely negative market conditions. 
 
Bodington (2014), in her thesis specificallyinvestigatinggold as a safe haven for South 
African stocks, found via various econometric calculations that gold does not act as a safe 
haven for international or dual-listed stocks. This is of paramount importance in that the local 
equity market as a whole in the South African context has been bearish on gold as an 
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investment over the last three to five years. Savvy investors encompassing the entire 
spectrum from equity funds to short-term arbitrage traders would know that stocks are the 
best performing asset class over the last 30 years and invest in shares found to be safe havens 
compared to the current asset portfolios in times of adverse market conditions. 
 
2.6 Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
In conducting thisliterature review, many factors affecting the price of stocks were 
investigated. Mostof these foundational papers address the role of fundamental analysis or the 
valuation of the firm’s underlying assets in relation to a stock’s price. Gruber (1966) points 
out that 87.5 % of the variation in stock prices can be based on fundamental analysis, but that 
still leaves a sizable percentage unaccounted for. Thesubsequent reviews of literature 
discussed issues that may fill in the missing chunk, namely: learning, macro-economic shocks 
(such as noise, fads and bubbles), the effect of news, human psychology and sentiment 
encompassed by behavioural finance, political risk, the effects of strikes and seasonality. The 
amount of material reviewed on the issue of seasonality piquedinitial interest in this concept 
and identified a gap in the local South African market context. Occurrences such as tax 
selling, Ramadan and strikes do occur frequently and are well known but the literature review 
shows that the market has still not completely factored these into stock prices and that the 
potential does exist to benefit from these events. 
 
Papers that showed the negative effects of strikes on shareholder wealth as well as the 
importance of unions in the industrial dispute context were also reviewed. Becker and Olson 
(1986) discuss that the market consistently underestimates the effects of strikes in the pre-
strike period. This is evidenced by the fact that two thirds of the total decline in returns 
occurs after the announcement of strikes.Another aspect of the literature review involved an 
investigation into the persistence of seasonality in both developed and emerging markets, as 
well as the major role that sentiment has shown to play. Both these factors are important in 
the context of thisstudy in that strike action is seasonal in South Africa and many sources 
were referenced that showed the persistence and power of sentiment-driven investor action. 
What happens in times of strife was another major factor to consider, mainly through the safe 
haven asset theory, which has proven to be significant in developed economies but not 
emerging ones such as South Africa. But South Africa does indeed experience strife, so 
where do these investors place their money to minimise risk if it is not in gold? Papers 
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referenced in the literature review indicate that it is usually placed in stocks over bonds. This 
means that if stocks are already part of a portfolio and they come under pressure, investors 
are more likely to move into another stock sector than an entire new asset class, such as 
commodities or bonds. Most trading platforms have evolved to specialise in either equity or 
specific asset classes to minimise transaction costs, and most day traders or those specialising 
in short-term strategies would only have access to equity markets, thus by necessity need to 
move into another equity sector. 
 
Therefore, this paper willstudythis issue in the South African market context and 
explorewhether capital flight from seasonally, possiblystrike-affected companies, actually 
benefits companies as they are thought to be safer rand-hedge options. 
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3. Methodology 
        
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research approach and the methodology used to achieve the 
research objectives, in which they will be analysed to answer the research questions of this 
study. The main aim of the chapter is to explore and present the estimation procedures used 
in analysing the direction of causality between stock market prices/indices. In it, the presence 
of monthly seasonality in stock market prices will also be questioned. Section 3.2 covers 
model specification and estimation of the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, including a 
description of the variables used. Unit root tests are discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
discusses the Granger-Causality test under the VAR framework, with Section 3.5 covering 
the correlation matrix, variance decomposition and impulse response functions. Section 3.6 
features a regression with autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) errors 
modelling framework for modelling the month of the year effect in the data.   
 
3.2 The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
 
The VAR model discussed in this project incorporates six stock market indices. All variables 
in a VAR model enter the model as endogenous variables. The purpose of the VAR model is 
to allow the incorporation of feedback in the model, in which all the seven variables in each 
model are allowed to affect each other and hence the interaction of all seven variables will be 
captured. The VAR model is given as: 
RDF𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖RDF𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
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WhereRDF represents Redefine Income Fund Ltd, CFR represents Richemont Securities Dr, 
SBK represents Standard Bank Group Ltd, SAB represents SAB Miller Plc, NPN represents 
Naspers Ltd, FSR represents FirstRand Ltd and RESI represents the Resource Index.   
3.3 Data and data sources 
The data has been obtained directly from the JSE. Data points will be analyseddaily to 
investigate foundational statistical properties of mean, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis 
and outliers. The daily data will be converted to monthly averages to counteract noisy 
trading, when actual models are used to test for seasonality. Time periods are from 1 January 
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2003 to 31 December 2012, which amounts to 3650 daily observations /520 weekly and 120 
monthly observations.This time period was chosen as it encompasses a number of prominent 
and headline-grabbing strikes. Saad (2004) claims that indices are the bestindicators of 
seasonality. Therefore the Resource Index (RESI) will be a proxy for the strike-affected 
mining industry and I will use the nine largest dual-listed stocks, as determined by market 
capitalisation, to represent the dual-listed industry. These will be used as proxy for the rand 
hedge category, which will amount to six stocks, once mutual stocks are excluded. These 
stocks are located in different sectors but are all deemed good rand hedges because of their 
overseas revenue streams. 
 
3.4 Unit root tests and test for cointegration 
 
3.4.1 Unit root tests 
Gujarati (2004) found that financial time series data tends to follow an upward or downward 
trend. This normally leads to the problem of non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is due to the 
moments of a distribution, which are time-varying, as described by Gujarati (2004). Spurious 
regressions usually arise when there are ‘correlated time trends’, which appear to be attractive 
at face value but without any ‘meaningful economic relationship’, as found by Granger and 
Newbold(1986). Gujarati (2004) adds that if a non-stationary variable is regressed on another 
non-stationary variable; the results obtained will be spurious. In order to test for non-
stationarity, unit root tests arecarried out and where the series is non-stationary, differencing 
is usually done until the series become stationary. In this project, the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests are used to investigate whether the variables are stationary or not. In 
equation (8), which represents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller specification, the unit root test 
is carried out as follows(Gujarati, 2004): 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛿𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                              (8) 
 
where𝑦𝑡 represents the variable under consideration,   represents the first difference 
operator, and 𝑡 stands for the time trend. The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root, i.e. 
𝛿 = 0 meaning the time series is not stationary. The alternative is that the time series is 
stationary, i.e. 𝛿 is less than zero.  
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3.4.2 Test for cointegration 
Having checked the order of integration of the variables through carrying out of unit root 
tests, it is also necessary to check for the possibility of cointegration amongst given non-
stationary variables (Engle and Granger, 1987; Gujarati, 2004; among others). The existence 
of such a long-running relationship typically occurs because of the relations of the stochastic 
trends of the given variables (Enders, 1995). As such, the variables may deviate from each 
other in the short run but eventually show affinity in the long run. Enders (1995) explained 
three important points with regards to the existence of cointegration: 
a) Cointegration refers to a linear combination of non-stationary variables and the linear 
combination of the given non-stationary variables should necessarily be stationary. 
b) For cointegration to exist, all the variables in a given model should be integrated of 
the same order. However, it does not necessarily follow that all variables that are 
integrated of the same order are cointegrated. 
c) If a given vector, say 𝐻𝑡 has 𝑛 variables, there can be at most 𝑛 − 1 linearly 
independent cointegrating vectors and the number of cointegration vectors gives the 
cointegration rank. 
 
Therefore, the fundamental aspect preceding the carrying out of any cointegration 
tests is that the variables should be integrated of the same order. If the variables are 
not integrated of the same order, then tests for cointegration cannot proceed. In 
addition, if variables are cointegrated, this will justify the use of error-correction 
models (ECMs) or the Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) so as to test for the 
direction of causality. In this project, the unrestricted VAR model is used, with return 
series data for the stocks, which are all first difference stationary. 
 
3.5 The Granger-Causality Model 
The causality between stock market indices is one of the main hypotheses of the study. In this 
project, the concepts of causality as defined by Granger (1979) will be adopted. Granger 
(1979) explained causality as the case where 𝑌𝑡 is causing𝑋𝑡, denoted as𝑌𝑡 → 𝑋𝑡. This is the 
instance where the use of the information set containing 𝑌𝑡 yields results that lead to a better 
explanation of 𝑋𝑡 than if 𝑌𝑡 is excluded. Granger (1979) also explained the concept of 
feedback, denoting as 𝑌𝑡 ↔ 𝑋𝑡 and arising when the two variables cause each other and the 
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inclusion of each of the variables in the prediction of the other variable leads to the yielding 
of better results; as well asthe concept of instantaneous causality, denoted as𝑌𝑡 → 𝑋𝑡. This is 
when the inclusion of the present value of 𝑌𝑡 leads to  better results from 𝑋𝑡 than if 𝑌𝑡 had not 
been incorporated in the estimation. 
 
In this project, the return series data of the stocks will be used to test for Granger-causality. 
That is, if 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 are stationary time series, then the null hypothesis states that 𝑥𝑡 does not 
Granger-cause 𝑦𝑡. Consider the regression model with lagged values of  𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 given in 
equation (9). 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑥𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜂𝑡                                                                                             (9) 
 
where 𝑎𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑚, 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘 are constants and 𝜂𝑡 is an error term. Only lagged 
values of 𝑥𝑡thatare statistically significant are kept in the regression model. The decision rule 
using 𝑝-values will be to reject the null hypothesis that 𝑥𝑡 does not Granger-cause 𝑦𝑡 if the 
level of significance denoted by 𝛼 (5% level of significance will be used in this project) is 
greater than the 𝑝-value. 
 
3.6 The correlation matrix, impulse response and variance decomposition functions 
The correlation matrix is employed in the study so as to investigate the relationship, i.e., 
either positive or negative and the interaction between stock market indices. The impulse 
response functions will also be employed in the study. These are used to capture the 
sensitivity of the long-run response of stock market indices. The variance decomposition 
function is important in that it explains the extent to which fluctuations in stock market 
indices can be explained by theirown variance and the extent to which they are explained by 
the variance of other variables. These impulse analysis models are very important in the sense 
that they enable us to analyse the financial markets in South Africa using the variables used 
in the Granger-causality tests. Variance decomposition analysis is useful in clarifying the 
percentage of variance of the forecasted variables (stock market indices) that can be 
attributed to its own variance. These results are expected to be consistent with the results 
from the Granger-causality.  
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3.7 Volatility and Regression with ARIMA errors 
 
3.7.1Volatility modelling 
The spread of asset returns is a major concern to stock brokers and risk managers in financial 
markets. This spread is referred to as volatility and is measured using the standard deviation 
of returns, the population standard deviation is usually not given and as a result an estimate is 
used, which is the sample standard deviation. This is calculated as: 
 
?̂? = √
1
𝑛 − 1
∑(𝑟𝑡 − ?̂?)2
𝑛
𝑡=1
                                                                                               (10) 
Where ?̂? is the estimated average return over the 𝑛-month period and 𝑟𝑡 is the return 
calculated as:  
𝑟𝑡 =  100ln
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
= 100(ln(𝑃𝑡) − ln(𝑃𝑡−1))                                                                (11) 
 
With 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡−1 as the current and one lagged stock prices on month 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 
respectively. The volatility of the return series is generally modelled using GARCH type 
models. GARCH models are an extension of the ARCH models developed by Engle (1982). 
Bollerslev (1986) extended the ARCH models to GARCH models. The GARCH model is 
given as: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = ⍺0 + ∑ ⍺𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2                                                                         (12) 
Where p is the order of GARCH process, q is the order of ARCH, ⍺0,⍺𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are constants, 
𝜎𝑡
2is the conditional variance of 𝜀𝑡, 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2  is the news about the volatility from the 𝑖𝑡ℎ period and 
𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2  is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ forecast error variance. 
 
3.7.2 Regression with autoregressive errors 
In order to capture monthly seasonality in the stock prices, the regression model will be used 
with autoregressive (AR) errors given in equation (13). The model in equation (13) assumes 
that the error terms are auto-correlated. 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖M𝑖𝑡
12
𝑖=2
+ 𝑢𝑡 
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(1 − ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝐵
𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
) 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                     (13) 
Where 𝑟𝑡 is the return series as defined in equation (10), 𝜔0, 𝜔𝑖, 𝜙𝑖, 𝜃𝑖 are parameters, 𝑢𝑡 is a 
stochastic disturbance term (error term), which is assumed to follow an autoregressive model 
of order 𝑝 (AR(𝑝)), i.e. the error terms are autocorrelated, 𝜀𝑡 is assumed to be an uncorrelated 
error term, i.e. it is white noise, 𝐵 is a backward shift operator (𝐵𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡−1), M𝑖𝑡 are dummy 
variables representing the months February up to December. The variable M𝑖𝑡 takes value 1 if 
the 𝑡 observation belongs to month 𝑖, where 𝑖 = 2 represents February, 𝑖 = 3 represents 
March up to 𝑖 = 12 representing December and 0 otherwise. The month of January is taken 
as a base month in order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity, which affects the stability 
of the regression coefficients when dummy variables are used to denote different periods in 
regression models (Makridakis, Wheelwright and Hyndman,1998). 
 
For example, if 𝑢𝑡 follows an AR(1) model we can write equation (13) as 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖M𝑖𝑡
12
𝑖=2
+ 𝑢𝑡 
(1 − 𝜙1𝐵)𝑢𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 
𝑢𝑡 − 𝜙1𝑢𝑡−1 = 𝜀𝑡 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜙1𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
Therefore, the final model will be written as: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖M𝑖𝑡
12
𝑖=2
+ 𝜙1𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                              (14)  
In this project, equation (14) will be used. In order to account for the monthly seasonality 
effect in the variance equation (volatility model), the model given in equation (15) will be 
used. 
𝜎𝑡
2 = ⍺0 + ∑ ⍺𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖M𝑖𝑡
12
𝑖=2
                                                                   (15) 
Assuming a GARCH(1,1) process equation (14) reduces to: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = ⍺0 + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖M𝑖𝑡
12
𝑖=2
                                                                                 (16) 
In this project, the parameter estimates of the GARCH models are obtained by the Berndt, 
Hall, B.H., Hall, R.E., Hausman(1974) algorithm using numerical derivatives.  
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4: Data analysis 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter,the data will be analysed using the steps and techniques described in chapter 
three. The statistical packages used in data analysis are Eviews, R and MINITAB. Microsoft 
Excel is also used for simple calculations and some graphical plots. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics and stationarity results 
A summary of the descriptive statistics for the six stocks including the RESI are shown in 
Table 4.1, while the summary statistics of monthly returns (𝑟𝑡) are given in Table 2. The 
values in parentheses under the Jarque-Bera test for normality are p-values. Asthe monthly 
stocks and the RESI increase with time, the return series summary statistics are used to test 
for normality astheir distributions are stationary. 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of monthly stocks and the RESI  
 
 
CFR FSR NPN RDF RESI SAB SBK 
Mean 3099.604 1722.756 20196.265 604.862 40724.2 17171.2 8258.88 
Median 2884.333 1780.95 17074.944 666.143 45317.2 16566.6 8944.29 
Maximum 6762.222 3043.889 54775.818 954.722 73818.2 39161.5 11474.3 
Minimum 1070.421 685.25 2115.947 232.952 15464.8 4880.85 2761.55 
Std. Dev. 1287.877 546.796 13925.457 209.443 15034.7 8242.08 2548.94 
Skewness 0.268 -0.005 0.666 -0.53 -0.237 0.629 -0.737 
Kurtosis 2.098 2.536 2.46 1.977 1.989 2.943 2.3689 
Jarque-Bera 
 
5.557 
(0.065) 
1.07 
(0.586) 
10.235 
(0.006) 
10.757 
(0.005) 
6.184 
(0.045) 
7.853 
(0.020) 
12.757 
(0.002) 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
 
The skewness is negative for all the returns as shown in Table 4.2. The negative values of 
skewness suggest greater probability of large decreases in stock returns during the sample 
period. In all cases, the values of the kurtosis are very high and greater than three, except for 
RDF, indicating that they are fat-tailed, i.e. their distributions are leptokurtic. The high values 
of kurtosis for the returns also suggest that extreme price changes occurred more frequently 
during the sampling period, from 2003 to 2012. The distributions of NPN, RDF and SBK are 
approximately normally distributed, as shown by the Jarque-Bera test for normality in Table 
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4.2.  Under the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the null hypothesis is that the distribution is 
approximately normally distributed. Using the level of significance of 5% the decision rule is 
to reject the null hypothesis if the level of significance is greater than the 𝑝-values, which are 
given in parentheses in Table 4.2 under the Jarque-Bera test. 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of monthly returns (𝒓𝒕)using Equation 11 
 
  CFR FSR NPN RDF RESI SAB SBK 
  Mean 1.240 1.196 2.589 1.077 0.817 1.583 1.102 
  Median 1.94 2.1 2.97 1.62 1.68 2.14 1.27 
  Maximum 15.14 12.02 19.73 12.69 15.03 11.93 10.96 
  Minimum -51.4 -17.39 -18.68 -12.27 -27.93 -15.06 -14.67 
  Std. Dev. 7.980 5.525 6.366 5.191 6.175 4.488 4.877 
 Skewness -3.125 -0.939 -0.255 -0.460 -0.983 -1.109 -0.4085 
  Kurtosis 19.975 4.005 3.384 2.823 6.055 5.124 3.470 
 Jarque-Bera 
 
1622.4 
(0.000) 
22.5 
(1.3E-05) 
2.0 
(0.365) 
4.4 
(0.113) 
65.5 
(6.1E-15) 
46.8 
(6.9E-11) 
4.4 
(0.111) 
  Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
  
Table 4.1 shows original values, whilst Table 4.2 shows returns as defined by equation (11)  
The time series plots of the stocks, the RESI and the return series plots are given in Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 respectively. The time series plots of the stocks and the RESI show that the 
monthly stock prices are not stationary while the plots for the returns are stationary, as shown 
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. All the stocks were affected by the worldwide economic recession 
(2008/2009) as shown by the time series plots in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The recession had a 
huge impact on the CFR stock in particular, as shown by Figure 4.1 panels (c) and (d). 
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Figure 4.1: Time series plots of the stocks, including the return series 
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Figure 4.2: Time series plots of the stocks, including the return series 
The time series plots of the stocks including the RESI in Figure 4.1 (a), (c), (e) and Figure 2 
(g), (i), (k), (m) show that the stocks are increasing with time. Formal unit root tests are 
carried out using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results of these ADF tests 
are summarised in Table 4.3. Using the absolute values, the calculated ADF statistic (t-
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statistic) figures given in column 2 of Table 4.3 are all less than the critical absolute value at 
5% level of significance. The null hypothesis of non-stationarityis thus not rejected, and the 
conclusion is that all the time series are integrated of order one, meaning that they are all not 
stationary. It should be noted that even at 1% and 10%, all the time series are not stationary 
(see Table 4.3). The logs of stock prices are stationary after taking the first differences, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, given in equation (10), which is 𝑟𝑡 =  100ln
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
. The absolute values 
of the calculated ADF statistic (t-statistic) given in column 4 of Table 4.3 are all greater than 
the critical absolute value at 10% level of significance, showing that the return series data is 
stationary. The conclusion thus is that all the stocks are stationary after the first difference of 
the logged data. 
 Table 4.3: Unit root tests 
                             Level                    First   Difference 
 𝑡-statistic 𝑡-test at 5%* 𝑡-statistic 𝑡-test at 5% 
CFR -0.370 -2.886 -6.944 -2.886 
FSR -0.755 -2.886 -8.757 -2.886 
NPN 1.784 -2.886 -8.439 -2.886 
RDF -0.843 -2.886 -8.406 -2.886 
RESI -1.790 -2.886 -8.056 -2.886 
SBK -1.730 -2.886 -5.300 -2.886 
SAB 2.130 -2.886 -9.408 -2.886 
*Critical values at 1% level and 10% level are -3.487 and -2.580 respectively. 
 
4.3 Correlations 
The correlation matrix for the monthly stocks is given in Table 4.4. The table summarises the 
relationship among the stocks and the RESI. The correlation matrix shows that there is a 
strong to very strong positive linear relationship between pairs of stocks. A number of these 
stocks have correlations above 0.75, showing high positive correlation and may indicate a 
joint movement due to investor action. 
Table 4.4: Correlation matrix for the monthly stocks 
 
CFR CFR FSR NPN RDF RESI SAB SBK 
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FSR 0.858 1 0.799 0.895 0.71 0.852 0.905 
NPN 0.721 0.799 1 0.862 0.687 0.976 0.818 
RDF 0.776 0.895 0.862 1 0.857 0.888 0.961 
RESI 0.802 0.71 0.687 0.857 1 0.735 0.859 
SAB 0.798 0.852 0.976 0.888 0.735 1 0.847 
SBK 0.76 0.905 0.818 0.961 0.859 0.847 1 
 
4.4 Interpretation of the Granger-Causality results 
One of the main objectives of empirical economics is that of causal relationships among 
variables. Table 4.5 below shows the pairwise Granger causality tests among variables used. 
In each of the pairs, a null hypothesis is stated and the F-statistic together their corresponding 
𝑝-values are given. The null hypothesis is rejected if the level of significance, which is 0.10 
in this study, is greater than the 𝑝-value. For example, the null hypothesis that FSR does not 
Granger-cause CFR is rejected, as 0.10 is greater than 0.007438 level of significance, but the 
null hypothesis that CFR does not Granger-cause FSR is accepted, as 0.10 is less than 
0.162042. This shows that Granger-causality for the two stocks is unidirectional. The phrase 
‘unidirectional’ implies that a specific stock has Granger-causality on another specific stock 
but not the other way around. In modern application, it could mean that an oil-based stock 
such as Sasol could have an impact and causality on another stock such as Super 
Group,which is an automotive industry share counter affected by petrol price,, but not that 
Super Group would have any effect on Sasol. Specifically to this research, this would mean 
that mining shares might affect dual-listed shares but not vice versa. 
 
Table 4.5: Pairwise Granger-Causality tests 
 
Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests 
  Date: 11/01/14   Time: 22:39 
  Sample: 2003:02 2012:12 
  Lags: 4 
  
   Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
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RTFSR does not Granger-Cause 
RTCFR 3.6923806 0.007438 
RTCFR does not Granger-Cause 
RTFSR 1.6714426 0.162042 
   RTNPN does not Granger-Cause 
RTCFR 2.6989314 0.034543 
RTCFR does not Granger-Cause 
RTNPN 0.2170351 0.928442 
   RTRDF does not Granger-Cause 
RTCFR 1.8033693 0.133592 
RTCFR does not Granger-Cause 
RTRDF 3.0128728 0.021297 
   RTRESI does not Granger-Cause 
RTCFR 5.0457074 0.000922 
RTCFR does not Granger-Cause 
RTRESI 0.8358347 0.505371 
 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to make the choice of lags employed (4). 
AIC is a measure of the relative quality of a statistical model for a given set of data 
 
4.5 The estimated VAR model 
4.5.1 The VAR estimates 
The results of the estimated VAR model are presented in Appendix 2. According to Gujarati 
(2004), it is not necessary to give detailed explanations of the individual coefficients and their 
signs and significance because they are likely to be inaccurate. Instead, emphasis should be 
placed on commenting on the impulse response functions and variance decomposition, as 
these provide useful and valid inferences about the whole system of equations. Hence, this 
project is focused on the impulse response functions and variance decompositions. 
 
4.5.2 Impulse response functions 
42 
 
The use of impulse functions is meant to show how each endogenous variable responds over 
time to innovations or shocks to each of the endogenous variables. As such, impulse response 
functions show how innovations to given endogenous variables spread through each and 
every endogenous variable and eventually how it affects the original variable itself. 
 
The results from the impulse response functions are presented in Appendix 3. The results 
show the impulse response functions of the six stocks to a permanent shock in the RESI and 
to each of the other stocks, where the response of these variables has been divided by the 
standard errors of their residuals. It is important to note that the results from the impulse 
response functions depend on the ordering of the variables. In this study, the Cholesky 
decomposition was used. 
 
The first row of the table in appendix 3 shows the sensitivities of the long run response of 
CFR to the other stock, including the RESI. For example,if a positive shock of one standard 
deviation is given to the RESI (1
st
 row 5
th
 panel); there will be an increasing positive 
response to CFR in the first four months and a decline thereafter. 
In specifically analysingthe effect of shocks to the RESI on the other stocks, it is apparent 
that shocks to the RESI result in a majority positive increase in the other stocks. Row 
5(appendix 3) shows these results are only negative for CFR and NPN, whereas shocks to the 
RESIare positive for the remaining sharesi.e. FSR, RDF, SAB and SBK. FSR stands for First 
Rand Bank and SBK for Standard Bank, and these two banking shares have the highest 
positive outcome. It is interesting to note that RDF or Redefine International, a property 
stock, also benefits from a shock to the resource sector. This indicates that investors seek safe 
havens such as dual-listed banking shares or even innovation in the form of property stocks in 
adverse conditions. Via analysis of the graph, it becomes apparent that these effects are 
visible for at least three months on all positively affected stocks, thus possibly creating a nice 
trading window of opportunity to work with. 
 
4.6 Monthly seasonality of stock returns 
 
4.6.1 Results from the time series regressions 
Table 4.6 presents a summary of the regression estimates of the variables of equation (14). 
The 𝑝-values are given in parentheses. Equation (14) can be written as 
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𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔2Feb + 𝜔3Mar + ⋯ + 𝜔12Dec + 𝜙1𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                               (17) 
 
In order to test whether a variable should be included in the regression model given in 
equation (17), it is important to test for each of the regression coefficients, with the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficient takes the value zero against the null hypothesis that 
it is not equal to zero. The decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis if the level of 
significance, 𝛼 (𝛼 =0.10 for this study) is greater than the 𝑝-value. For the CFR, only 
September has a significant regression coefficient. 
 
TheLjung-Box Q-statistics are used to test for autocorrelation and also to test for 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial autocorrelation in the 
residuals up to lag order 𝑙( = 5 in this study). An alternative test is that of the Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. For the CFR regression model, there is no serial 
autocorrelation at lag 5, but there is evidence of heteroscedasticityasthe 𝑄2statistic at lag 5 
has a 𝑝-value (𝑝 = 0.000), which is less than the 10% level of significance. The GARCH 
model is used so as to capture this heteroscedasticity. 
 
All the Ljung-Box Q-statistics on standardised residuals in Table 4.6 are insignificant up to 
lag 5 at the 10% level, indicating that there is no excessive autocorrelation left in the 
residuals. However, the Ljung-Box Q-statistics on squared standardised residuals are 
significant up to lag 5 at the 10% level for the following stocks: CFR, RDF, SBK and SAB. 
This indicates that there is heteroscedasticity in the residuals for these stocks. There can be 
some improvement on the current models for these four stocks. This improvement is 
implemented through volatility modelling. The results of the monthly seasonality of stock 
returns in mean and volatility are presented in Table 4.7. From Table 4.6, there is no evidence 
of monthly seasonality in the RESI. The monthly 𝑝-values for the coefficients of February, 
September and November are all significant for the FSR stock, indicating the presence of 
monthly seasonality in this stock for these months. For NPN, monthly seasonality is present 
in the months of February, November and December. 
 
Table 4.6: Monthly seasonality of stock returns 
 
 CFR FSR NPN RDF RESI SBK SAB 
ϕ 0.400 0.223 0.269 0.230 0.283 0.256 0.105 
44 
 
(0.085) (0.031) (0.004) (0.018) (0.021) (0.004) (0.109) 
February -0.450 
(0.764) 
-0.605 
(0.673) 
2.315 
(0.029) 
-0.624 
(0.644) 
2.075 
(0.419) 
-1.053 
(0.537) 
-0.680 
(0.427) 
March 0.951 
(0.547) 
-1.378 
(0.445) 
-1.235 
(0.481) 
1.940 
(0.240) 
-0.459 
(0.767) 
0.413 
(0.782) 
-1.025 
(0.537) 
April 1.802 
(0.319) 
2.924 
(0.064) 
3.896 
(0.068) 
3.076 
(0.009) 
1.398 
(0.448) 
3.120 
(0.023) 
3.200 
(0.000) 
May 2.772 
(0.211) 
-0.896 
(0.586) 
3.138 
(0.146) 
-2.909 
(0.067) 
-0.368 
(0.844) 
-0.967 
(0.513) 
3.004 
(0.014) 
June 1.997 
(0.374) 
-0.872 
(0.602) 
1.519 
(0.410) 
-2.728 
(0.177) 
1.524 
(0.350) 
-1.116 
(0.490) 
1.707 
(0.140) 
July -0.147 
(0.929) 
3.032 
(0.011) 
0.920 
(0.636) 
2.115 
(0.307) 
-1.193 
(0.546) 
2.874 
(0.013) 
0.576 
(0.765) 
August 3.127 
(0.247) 
0.811 
(0.554) 
3.341 
(0.091) 
2.365 
(0.173) 
0.690 
(0.800) 
0.060 
(0.967) 
2.272 
(0.062) 
September 4.240 
(0.049) 
3.563 
(0.021) 
3.166 
(0.024) 
2.617 
(0.030) 
1.769 
(0.402) 
0.683 
(0.646) 
3.688 
(4.08E-06) 
October -0.371 
(0.914) 
0.457 
(0.846) 
3.916 
(0.158) 
2.134 
(0.142) 
0.353 
(0.902) 
0.933 
(0.657) 
2.022 
(0.225) 
November -1.025 
(0.820) 
3.217 
(0.004) 
3.995 
(0.020) 
0.674 
(0.644) 
0.566 
(0.725) 
1.768 
(0.181) 
2.548 
(0.057) 
December 2.002 
(0.422) 
1.738 
(0.499) 
5.051 
(0.036) 
2.163 
(0.211) 
0.481 
(0.724) 
3.457 
(0.013) 
2.275 
(0.049) 
Model diagnostics 
𝑄(5) (7.065) 
0.132 
4.921 
(0.295) 
0.614 
(0.961) 
5.707 
(0.222) 
4.761 
(0.313) 
5.453 
(0.244) 
7.597 
(0.107) 
𝑄2(5) (35.727) 
0.000 
1.803 
(0.772) 
2.555 
(0.635) 
11.399 
(0.022) 
6.838 
(0.145) 
14.272 
(0.006) 
21.114 
(0.000) 
R-Squared 0.194 0.135 0.140 0.181 0.100 0.151 0.125 
Table 4.6 is used to tabulate the results of the seasonality test.A complete analysis shows FSR 
has seasonality on April, July, September and November. NPN displays seasonality in 
February, April, August, September, November and December. RDF displays seasonality in 
April and September only. SBK displays seasonality in April, July and December. SAB 
displays seasonality in April, May, August, September November and December. The key 
months that stick out are April (4), September (4), November (3) and December (3). 
 
Table 4.7: Monthly seasonality of stock returns in mean and volatility 
 
 CFR FSR NPN RDF RESI SBK SAB 
Mean Equation 
ϕ 0.166   0.215   0.218 0.111 
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(0.0702) (0.002) (0.000) (0.048) 
February 1.010 
(0.233) 
  -0.998  
(0.215) 
 -0.900 
(0.438) 
-0.361 
(0.680) 
March 2.048 
(0.053) 
  1.681  
(0.101) 
 0.980 
(0.373) 
-0.832 
(0.267) 
April 2.900 
(0.014)  
 3.109  
(6.00E-05) 
 2.877 
(0.009) 
2.566 
(0.005) 
May 1.817 
(0.168) 
  -1.670 
(0.049) 
 -0.940 
(0.434) 
2.201 
(1.14E-05) 
June 3.243 
(0.052) 
  -1.626  
(0.114) 
 -0.468 
(0.706) 
1.398 
(0.144) 
July -0.371 
(0.780) 
  2.747  
(0.025) 
 2.680 
(0.003) 
0.471 
(0.678) 
August 2.210 
(0.290) 
  1.669 
 (0.044) 
 -0.564 
(0.638) 
2.223 
(0.033) 
September 5.580 
(0.001) 
  2.607  
(0.010) 
 0.050 
(0.965) 
3.596 
(1.69E-08) 
October 0.425 
(0.844) 
  2.033 
 (0.012) 
 0.524 
(0.680) 
2.234 
(0.010) 
November 2.401 
(0.153) 
  -0.127 
 (0.868) 
 1.373 
(0.116) 
2.492 
(0.013) 
December 1.864 
(0.045) 
  1.522  
(0.140) 
 2.946 
(0.003) 
1.420 
(0.072) 
Variance equation 
⍺0 45.784 
(0.003)  
 -2.118 
(0.673) 
 22.432 
(0.040) 
15.140 
(0.059) 
⍺1 0.323 
(0.031) 
  -0.059 
(0.367) 
 -0.083 
(0.003) 
-0.083 
(0.002) 
⍺2    0.301 
(0.001) 
 0.249 
(0.003) 
0.246 
(2.40E-05) 
𝛽1 0.411 
(0.001) 
  0.672 
(4.63E-22) 
 0.685 
(1.95E-09) 
0.620 
(1.44E-09) 
February -64.102 
(0.004) 
  1.141 
(0.886) 
 -29.519 
(0.118) 
-23.677 
(0.065) 
March -35.654 
(0.030) 
  1.608 
(0.784) 
 -23.869 
(0.050) 
-6.358 
(0.475) 
April -48.674 
(0.003) 
  -2.270 
(0.664) 
 -24.183 
(0.044) 
-11.886 
(0.243) 
May -33.616 
(0.046) 
  15.311 
(0.038) 
 -14.601 
(0.234) 
-21.08 
(0.017) 
June -14.577 
(0.524) 
  16.073 
(0.147) 
 -10.659 
(0.492) 
-6.518 
(0.463) 
July -59.276 
(0.001) 
  -0.475 
(0.967) 
 -33.305 
(0.013) 
6.572 
(0.681) 
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August -0.687 
(0.981) 
  -9.058 
(0.221) 
 -15.982 
(0.167) 
-18.705 
(0.148) 
September -48.689 
(0.020) 
  2.579 
(0.682) 
 -17.767 
(0.163) 
-23.454 
(0.004) 
October 44.188 
(0.490) 
  1.869 
(0.740) 
 -7.989 
(0.606) 
-7.556 
(0.411) 
November -79.035 
(0.011) 
  2.892 
(0.581) 
 -33.549 
(0.010) 
-5.624 
(0.602) 
December -49.702 
(0.002) 
  14.261 
(0.129) 
 -19.472 
(0.116) 
-17.737 
(0.069) 
Model diagnostics 
𝑄(5) 6.245 
(0.182) 
  6.363 
(0.174) 
 1.043 
(0.903) 
3.113 
(0.539) 
𝑄2(5) 3.759 
(0.440) 
  4.556 
(0.336) 
 2.969 
(0.563) 
7.132 
(0.129) 
R-Squared 0.111   0.168  0.143 0.116 
 
All stocks in this table failed the Ljung Box test for second order serial correlation (test for 
constant variance). This indicates that there is heteroscedasticity in the residuals for these 
stocks. This was corrected by making use of GARCH models, as in Table 4.7. 
4.6.2 Time seriesdecomposition  
In order to have a better understanding of the performance of the six stocks and the RESI on a 
monthly basis, time series decomposition was carried out for the each of the stocks using the 
statistical package MINITAB. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present graphical plots of the seasonal 
indices for RDF stock and the RESI. The plots of the seasonal indices of the other stocks are 
given in appendix 5. From Figure 4.4, the stock price of RDF was above average in January, 
February, April, September, October and December.  
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Figure 4.4: Plot of seasonal indices of RDF stock 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Plot of seasonal indices of the RESI 
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5: Interpretation and further study 
5.1 Interpretation 
The VAR model used does infact show seasonality present in thesix dual-listed stocks, but 
none in the RESI. The Granger-Causality test, when analysed in conjunction with the 
correlation co-efficient and the time series decomposition/impulsetest, does show casualty 
between many stocks, including the RESI on dual-listed stock (see appendix 4.4).The effect 
of shocks (via impulse test) to the RESI and subsequent ramifications for the banking shares 
SBK and FSR in particular, as well as property stock RDF, shows that there is in fact 
causality present on the Johannesburg Stock exchange. The key months that stick out are 
April (4), September (4), November (3) and December (3). This clearly indicates that the 
effect of mining induced seasonality can be found in that the major months as evidenced in 
my literature review states that the most frequent months for commencement of strikes are 
April and September. April is pronounced because that is when strike season usually 
commences. September is pronounced in that this is the most watched month by investors as 
strikes either get resolved or more pronounced industrial action is called for by unions.Past 
analysis of data shows that September is usually when strike season ends with unions and 
mining houses having reached an end to negotiations. November and December also rank 
highly and could indicate the laggard after effects of the strikes in continued monetary flow 
movement after the effects of the September industrial action. If the dispute has been 
resolved – investors that sold their shares in resource stocks and entered positions in dual 
listed stocks may choose to sell their positions in the dual listed stocks and re- enter positions 
in resources stocks as they would be driven up by the end in labour disputes. They would 
pick up resource stocks at much lower levels then before the April strikes and look to play the 
same strategy for the next year i.e. to switch in between the dual listed shares and resource 
stocks timed by the periodization caused by industrial dispute. Seasonality in November and 
December also tie in with the end of year tax selling hypothesis wherein which, investors 
realise losses for tax benefits. 
 
As Bauer and McDermott (2010)said, hedges can co-move with stocks in negative periods 
due to herd behaviour or contagion versus safe haven, which always hold their value. 
Thus,these rand hedge stocks cannot be excluded as hedges, as their value increases in these 
times but the theory that they are safe haven assets must be rejected, because not all of them 
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hold their value. These dual-listed stocks were proven to be statistically leptokurtic and prone 
to large movements and thus the domain of the more risk-attracted investor – their seasonal 
components do imply that there must be similar thinking and joint investor action in these 
stocks to induce these seasonal components, which leads to the conclusion that there is a 
large degree of joint sentiment-driven investment present. Therefore: 
𝐻0
1is rejected, because it was statistically proven that seasonality is present in these stocks 
𝐻0
2is accepted, because seasonality in this index could not be proved, although there is indeed 
causality present between this index and the other rand hedge stocks, which could be used to 
obtain above-market returns. 
 
5.2 Further research 
The research has established that dual-listed stocks do possess seasonality and, for certain 
stocks, causality. If these stocks are rand sensitive and seasonal, that must imply a seasonal 
component to the rand currency. Further research could delve deeper into what causes this 
seasonality in the form of: 
a)Exploring the macro-economic stimuli that affect the rand; 
b) Deeper investigation into labour sentiment gauges (similar to the VIX Index) or other 
factors influencing the rand’s apparent seasonality. 
c) SAB, NPN and RDF are vastly different stocks in terms of their core functions and could 
have been chosen due to this diversification being seen as an effective hedge. FSR and SBK – 
both banking stocks also show seasonality and further research could be done to investigate 
what sets them apart from other banking stocks such as ABSA – now Barclays Africa ( BGL) 
and Nedbank (NED).Further research should also be conducted on stocks proven via the 
Granger-causality test, as this could lead to opportunities for above-market returns. 
Summary : My research has proven via econometric tests that seasonality does in fact exist 
in dual listed shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Months where identified with 
significant seasonal properties and savvy investors may well benefit from implementing a 
strategy aligned to these yearly market movements to obtain above the market returns.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Time series plots of stocks and the logarithmic returns 
 
Fig 1.1: Time series plots of raw data 
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Fig 1.2: Time series plots of return series 
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Appendix 2: VAR models (Vector Autoregression Estimates) 
 
 Vector 
Autoregression 
Estimates               
 Date: 10/23/14   
Time: 15:35               
 Sample(adjusted): 
2003:06 2012:12               
 Included 
observations: 115 
after adjusting 
endpoints               
 Standard errors in ( ) 
& t-statistics in [ ]               
                
  RTCFR RTFSR RTNPN RTRDF RTRESI RTSAB RTSBK 
  
       RTCFR(-1) 0.1935669 -0.07208 -0.10234 -0.03876 0.02628 -0.1371 -0.03605 
  0.1298893 0.113807 0.133753 0.097753 0.12035 0.0792 0.099005 
  [ 1.49025] [-0.63331] [-0.76517] [-0.39651] [ 0.21833] [-1.73050] [-0.36416] 
  
       RTCFR(-2) -0.073851 0.082472 0.044123 -0.19693 -0.01032 0.1142 -0.0828 
  0.1274289 0.111652 0.131219 0.095901 0.11807 0.0777 0.09713 
  [-0.57955] [ 0.73866] [ 0.33625] [-2.05352] [-0.08741] [ 1.46934] [-0.85242] 
  
       RTCFR(-3) 0.0178574 0.089079 -0.06927 -0.04785 -0.0752 -0.0349 0.152172 
  0.1301089 0.114 0.133979 0.097918 0.12055 0.0794 0.099172 
  [ 0.13725] [ 0.78140] [-0.51706] [-0.48869] [-0.62380] [-0.43948] [ 1.53441] 
  
       RTCFR(-4) 0.1791772 0.179396 0.07352 0.101028 0.20149 0.2626 -0.04974 
  0.1143755 0.100214 0.117778 0.086077 0.10597 0.0698 0.08718 
  [ 1.56657] [ 1.79013] [ 0.62422] [ 1.17369] [ 1.90137] [ 3.76367] [-0.57057] 
  
       RTFSR(-1) 0.0485959 -0.17136 -0.01843 0.206217 -0.11177 0.1879 -0.10112 
  0.2310775 0.202467 0.237951 0.173905 0.2141 0.141 0.176133 
  [ 0.21030] [-0.84638] [-0.07746] [ 1.18580] [-0.52202] [ 1.33276] [-0.57412] 
  
       RTFSR(-2) -0.263564 0.02325 -0.08353 0.170878 -0.46655 -0.0587 0.059467 
  0.2273624 0.199212 0.234125 0.171109 0.21066 0.1387 0.173302 
  [-1.15922] [ 0.11671] [-0.35677] [ 0.99865] [-2.21472] [-0.42299] [ 0.34314] 
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RTFSR(-3) 0.1969208 -0.16721 -0.17504 -0.00559 -0.14648 -0.1585 -0.1258 
  0.2258467 0.197884 0.232565 0.169969 0.20926 0.1378 0.172146 
  [ 0.87192] [-0.84499] [-0.75266] [-0.03288] [-0.70000] [-1.15030] [-0.73077] 
  
       RTFSR(-4) -0.075035 -0.13115 -0.03417 -0.09249 -0.01322 -0.0876 -0.09226 
  0.2295913 0.201165 0.236421 0.172787 0.21272 0.1401 0.175001 
  [-0.32682] [-0.65198] [-0.14452] [-0.53529] [-0.06216] [-0.62555] [-0.52722] 
  
       RTNPN(-1) 0.3286794 0.13522 0.113851 -0.04855 0.20549 0.0787 -0.01232 
  0.1600322 0.140218 0.164792 0.120438 0.14828 0.0976 0.121981 
  [ 2.05383] [ 0.96436] [ 0.69087] [-0.40308] [ 1.38587] [ 0.80562] [-0.10102] 
  
       RTNPN(-2) -0.092295 -0.00318 0.022612 -0.00768 -0.24324 -0.1036 0.085002 
  0.1561314 0.1368 0.160776 0.117502 0.14466 0.0953 0.119007 
  [-0.59114] [-0.02327] [ 0.14064] [-0.06538] [-1.68146] [-1.08783] [ 0.71426] 
  
       RTNPN(-3) -0.297606 -0.09596 -0.19709 0.016581 -0.25136 -0.1314 -0.15365 
  0.1590811 0.139385 0.163813 0.119722 0.14739 0.0971 0.121256 
  [-1.87078] [-0.68848] [-1.20314] [ 0.13849] [-1.70535] [-1.35428] [-1.26718] 
  
       RTNPN(-4) 0.1353503 0.108197 0.073144 0.131716 0.07425 -0.0098 0.101878 
  0.1574849 0.137986 0.162169 0.118521 0.14592 0.0961 0.120039 
  [ 0.85945] [ 0.78412] [ 0.45103] [ 1.11133] [ 0.50885] [-0.10237] [ 0.84871] 
  
       RTRDF(-1) 0.0385338 0.024917 0.033148 0.183373 0.05183 0.0071 0.098995 
  0.1704136 0.149314 0.175483 0.128251 0.15789 0.104 0.129894 
  [ 0.22612] [ 0.16687] [ 0.18890] [ 1.42980] [ 0.32828] [ 0.06827] [ 0.76212] 
  
       RTRDF(-2) 0.0614369 -0.0327 0.025243 -0.03126 0.18273 0.0763 -0.13087 
  0.1692409 0.148287 0.174275 0.127368 0.15681 0.1033 0.129 
  [ 0.36301] [-0.22050] [ 0.14484] [-0.24539] [ 1.16532] [ 0.73938] [-1.01447] 
  
       RTRDF(-3) -0.012899 0.158058 0.176724 0.183837 0.17551 0.0346 0.204567 
  0.1548266 0.135657 0.159432 0.11652 0.14345 0.0945 0.118013 
  [-0.08331] [ 1.16513] [ 1.10846] [ 1.57773] [ 1.22347] [ 0.36650] [ 1.73343] 
  
       RTRDF(-4) -0.150981 -0.10161 -0.24744 -0.29778 0.09838 -0.0586 -0.08723 
  0.1511587 0.132443 0.155655 0.11376 0.14005 0.0922 0.115217 
  [-0.99883] [-0.76717] [-1.58964] [-2.61765] [ 0.70245] [-0.63545] [-0.75711] 
  
       RTRESI(-1) 0.1954494 0.011602 -0.03185 0.052471 0.15262 0.0033 0.043386 
  0.1485356 0.130145 0.152954 0.111786 0.13762 0.0906 0.113218 
  [ 1.31584] [ 0.08915] [-0.20820] [ 0.46939] [ 1.10897] [ 0.03678] [ 0.38321] 
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       RTRESI(-2) 0.3008981 -0.06917 0.119843 0.05731 0.12078 0.0411 -0.02394 
  0.146106 0.128016 0.150452 0.109957 0.13537 0.0891 0.111366 
  [ 2.05945] [-0.54031] [ 0.79655] [ 0.52120] [ 0.89223] [ 0.46153] [-0.21493] 
  
       RTRESI(-3) 0.3492566 -1.20E-01 0.135636 -0.00777 0.13881 0.1982 0.037302 
  0.1458232 1.28E-01 0.150161 0.109744 0.13511 0.089 0.11115 
  [ 2.39507] [-0.93885] [ 0.90327] [-0.07080] [ 1.02740] [ 2.22743] [ 0.33560] 
  
       RTRESI(-4) -0.197896 -0.15734 0.04635 0.079702 -0.26788 -0.1869 -0.0027 
  0.1572249 0.137758 0.161902 0.118325 0.14567 0.0959 0.119841 
  [-1.25868] [-1.14212] [ 0.28628] [ 0.67358] [-1.83892] [-1.94859] [-0.02250] 
  
       RTSAB(-1) -0.215335 -0.08788 0.029622 -0.20005 -0.09142 0.0655 -0.143 
  0.2128541 0.1865 0.219186 0.160191 0.19722 0.1299 0.162243 
  [-1.01166] [-0.47119] [ 0.13515] [-1.24880] [-0.46357] [ 0.50457] [-0.88139] 
  
       RTSAB(-2) 0.011535 0.216308 -0.00587 0.124891 0.11194 -0.193 0.179938 
  0.2095818 0.183633 0.215816 0.157728 0.19419 0.1279 0.159749 
  [ 0.05504] [ 1.17794] [-0.02721] [ 0.79181] [ 0.57645] [-1.50966] [ 1.12638] 
  
       RTSAB(-3) 0.3084723 0.34064 0.274568 0.235141 0.26562 0.1005 0.258378 
  0.2043054 0.17901 0.210383 0.153757 0.1893 0.1246 0.155727 
  [ 1.50986] [ 1.90291] [ 1.30509] [ 1.52930] [ 1.40321] [ 0.80652] [ 1.65917] 
  
       RTSAB(-4) 0.0334042 0.077089 -0.24939 -0.03475 -0.04546 -0.1403 0.07085 
  0.1923104 0.1685 0.198031 0.14473 0.17818 0.1173 0.146584 
  [ 0.17370] [ 0.45750] [-1.25934] [-0.24009] [-0.25512] [-1.19620] [ 0.48334] 
  
       RTSBK(-1) 0.0595052 0.384524 0.376164 0.071274 -0.05052 0.0102 0.388679 
  0.2446911 0.214395 0.25197 0.184151 0.22672 0.1493 0.18651 
  [ 0.24318] [ 1.79353] [ 1.49289] [ 0.38704] [-0.22282] [ 0.06834] [ 2.08396] 
  
       RTSBK(-2) -0.139501 -0.21994 -0.08214 -0.30965 0.31067 0.0432 -0.21641 
  0.2341136 0.205127 0.241078 0.17619 0.21691 0.1428 0.178448 
  [-0.59587] [-1.07223] [-0.34073] [-1.75745] [ 1.43221] [ 0.30231] [-1.21272] 
  
       RTSBK(-3) -0.069278 0.075591 0.13817 0.000117 0.30483 0.1231 0.153037 
  0.2427983 0.212737 0.25002 0.182726 0.22496 0.1481 0.185067 
  [-0.28533] [ 0.35533] [ 0.55263] [ 0.00064] [ 1.35502] [ 0.83108] [ 0.82693] 
  
       RTSBK(-4) 0.1723032 0.024656 0.089003 0.061951 0.13175 0.1747 -0.08141 
  0.2529496 0.221631 0.260474 0.190366 0.23437 0.1543 0.192805 
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  [ 0.68118] [ 0.11125] [ 0.34169] [ 0.32543] [ 0.56215] [ 1.13234] [-0.42224] 
  
       C 0.1760866 0.091441 2.227413 0.603282 0.3791 1.8668 0.379492 
  0.8633988 0.756499 0.889081 0.649781 0.79997 0.5268 0.658105 
  [ 0.20395] [ 0.12087] [ 2.50530] [ 0.92844] [ 0.47389] [ 3.54404] [ 0.57664] 
  
        R-squared 0.4948551 0.247829 0.190604 0.342849 0.30711 0.3671 0.25323 
 Adj. R-squared 0.3303893 0.002936 -0.07292 0.128892 0.08151 0.1611 0.010095 
 Sum sq. resids 3467.1507 2661.744 3676.484 1963.737 2976.44 1290.5 2014.375 
 S.E. equation 6.349465 5.563318 6.538334 4.77851 5.883 3.8738 4.839728 
 F-statistic 3.0088635 1.011988 0.72329 1.602423 1.36132 1.7817 1.04152 
 Log likelihood -359.0319 -343.832 -362.403 -326.344 -350.257 -302.21 -327.808 
Akaike AIC 6.7483811 6.48403 6.807005 6.179897 6.59578 5.7601 6.205357 
 Schwarz SC 7.4405814 7.17623 7.499205 6.872098 7.28798 6.4523 6.897557 
 Mean dependent 1.5094783 1.254696 2.752174 1.127217 1.00783 1.7351 1.145913 
 S.D. dependent 7.7593607 5.571503 6.312239 5.119842 6.1385 4.2293 4.864343 
  
        Determinant Residual 
Covariance 
 
4.33E+08 
      Log Likelihood (d.f. 
adjusted) 
 
-2285.71 
     Akaike Information 
Criteria 
 
43.28198 
      Schwarz Criteria 
 
48.12738 
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Appendix 3: Impulse response functions 
 
Figure 3.1: Impulse response functions 
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Appendix 4: Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests 
Table 4.1: Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests 
Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests       
Date: 11/01/14   Time: 22:39       
Sample: 2003:02 2012:12       
Lags: 4       
        
  RTSAB does not Granger-Cause RTCFR 115 1.3142613 0.269436 
  RTCFR does not Granger-Cause RTSAB   3.5091424 0.00988 
        
  RTSBK does not Granger-Cause RTCFR 115 3.5469922 0.009318 
  RTCFR does not Granger-Cause RTSBK   1.2090358 0.311358 
        
  RTNPN does not Granger-Cause RTFSR 115 0.4527613 0.770179 
  RTFSR does not Granger-Cause RTNPN   0.4776257 0.752079 
        
  RTRDF does not Granger-Cause RTFSR 115 0.4544917 0.768921 
  RTFSR does not Granger-Cause RTRDF   1.8234093 0.129705 
        
  RTRESI does not Granger-Cause RTFSR 115 0.1728802 0.951853 
  RTFSR does not Granger-Cause RTRESI   2.6759294 0.035784 
        
  RTSAB does not Granger-Cause RTFSR 115 1.6063451 0.178076 
  RTFSR does not Granger-Cause RTSAB   2.1801169 0.076156 
        
  RTSBK does not Granger-Cause RTFSR 115 1.3608355 0.252513 
  RTFSR does not Granger-Cause RTSBK   0.0864311 0.986479 
        
  RTRDF does not Granger-Cause RTNPN 115 0.6454763 0.631282 
  RTNPN does not Granger-Cause RTRDF   1.5317976 0.198231 
        
  RTRESI does not Granger-Cause RTNPN 115 0.8812282 0.477872 
  RTNPN does not Granger-Cause RTRESI   2.0564438 0.09172 
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  RTSAB does not Granger-Cause RTNPN 115 0.7158374 0.58292 
  RTNPN does not Granger Cause RTSAB   1.1096624 0.355922 
        
  RTSBK does not Granger-Cause RTNPN 115 0.8015397 0.526837 
  RTNPN does not Granger-Cause RTSBK   0.4040344 0.805376 
        
    
Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests    
Date: 11/01/14   Time: 22:39       
Sample: 2003:02 2012:12       
Lags: 4       
    
  RTRESI does not Granger-Cause RTRDF 115 0.479551 0.750676 
  RTRDF does not Granger-Cause RTRESI   1.9772072 0.103253 
        
  RTSAB does not Granger-Cause RTRDF 115 1.6423333 0.169038 
  RTRDF does not Granger-Cause RTSAB   0.6298242 0.642281 
        
  RTSBK does not Granger-Cause RTRDF 115 2.9286999 0.024252 
  RTRDF does not Granger-Cause RTSBK   0.4835922 0.747731 
        
  RTSAB does not Granger-Cause RTRESI 115 0.5972245 0.665427 
  RTRESI does not Granger-Cause RTSAB   1.1021968 0.359473 
        
  RTSBK does not Granger-Cause RTRESI 115 1.3115087 0.270467 
  RTRESI does not Granger-Cause RTSBK   0.8187067 0.516019 
        
  RTSBK does not Granger-Cause RTSAB 115 1.3225632 0.266349 
  RTSAB does not Granger-Cause RTSBK   2.2092678 0.072878 
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Appendix 5: Residuals for VAR model 
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Appendix 6: Plots of seasonal indices 
 
Figure 6.1: Plot of seasonal indices of CFR stock 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Plot of seasonal indices of SBK stock 
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Figure 6.3: Plot of seasonal indices of SAB stock 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Plot of seasonal indices of NPN stock 
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Figure 6.5: Plot of seasonal indices of FSR stock 
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Appendix 7:Topic index tables 
7.1 Table A1Constituents of the Top 40 Index 
 
 
7.2: Table A2Constituents of RESI Index: 
IndexCode IndexName NumberofConstituents MarketCapitalisation Alpha InstrumentName Price MCap Gross Weight
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        AGL Anglo American 259.58 364827.9915 6.03270853
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        AMS Anglo American Platinum 476.7 128557.3551 0.497526189
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        ANG Anglogold Ashanti 172.41 69360.63507 1.22013925
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        APN Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 305 138707.7344 1.634827061
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        ARI African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 185.29 39929.91329 0.32311159
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        ASR Assore Ltd 347.96 48577.65172 0.205089816
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        BGA Barclays Africa Group Ltd 160.52 136080.939 0.909656089
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        BIL BHP Billiton 338.21 722479.2824 12.70930303
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        BTI British American Tobacco PLC 650 1316875.55 3.474820144
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        BVT Bidvest Group 286.04 95179.75937 1.590613063
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        CCO Capital & Counties Properties PLC 58.3 43907.35092 0.20081998
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        CFR Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG 111.06 579733.2 9.790294191
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        DSY Discovery Ltd 93.01 54660.36328 0.480771655
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        EXX Exxaro Resources 140.5 50283.59207 0.318438179
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        FSR Firstrand Limited 41.1 230717.6018 2.11047596
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        GRT Growthpoint Prop Ltd 24.25 51582.59123 0.834809378
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        IMP Impala Platinum Hlds 112.62 71051.87061 1.024909941
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        INL Investec Ltd 96.51 27306.01139 0.413097965
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        INP Investec PLC 96.35 58324.37556 1.025997812
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        IPL Imperial Holdings 199.5 41887.87067 0.611593292
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        ITU Intu Properties Plc 56.28 69971.73328 0.861622456
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        KIO Kumba Iron Ore 334.02 107025.0454 0.338886495
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        LHC Life Healthcare Group Holdings 40.16 41855.14356 0.647929636
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        MDC Mediclinic International 80.2 66324.79634 0.583367548
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        MND Mondi Ltd 193.09 22844.53544 0.401863598
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        MNP Mondi Plc 193.2 70950.92353 1.248114388
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        MTN MTN Group 229 431224.6003 7.206484728
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        NED Nedbank Group 232.4 118571.4972 0.813469451
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        NPN Naspers 1235 513192.2199 8.486023974
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        OML Old Mutual 35.9 174715.3336 2.950520196
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        REI Reinet Investments 26 50944.73436 0.672135606
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        REM Remgro 223.19 107378.1307 1.88891396
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        RMH RMB Holdings 52.93 74721.45133 0.617788036
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        SAB SABMiller 627.36 1043588.23 10.83122359
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        SBK Standard Bank Group 146 234386.7433 3.09236426
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        SHF Steinhoff International Holdings 54.88 111672.9242 1.964464682
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        SHP Shoprite 159 90722.13414 1.212894948
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        SLM Sanlam 61.66 129486 2.050036821
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        SOL Sasol 638.62 411108.1228 6.147114753
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        TBS Tiger Brands 315.99 60000.77273 0.823280413
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        VOD Vodacom Group 127.5 189714.135 0.734207316
J200 Top 40 42 5,684,649,114,342        WHL Woolworths Holdings 78.59 66535.87932 1.018290027
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Appendix 8 – Volume of mining production (base 2010=100) 
 
  
IndexCode IndexName NumberofConstituents MarketCapitalisation Alpha InstrumentName Price MCap Gross Weight
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          AGL Anglo American 259.58 364827.9915 19.89449919
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          AMS Anglo American Platinum 476.7 128557.3551 1.640728095
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          ANG Anglogold Ashanti 172.41 69360.63507 4.023741443
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          AQP Aquarius Platinum 4.37 6199.081015 0.129463343
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          ARI African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 185.29 39929.91329 1.065548456
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          ASR Assore Ltd 347.96 48577.65172 0.676339518
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          BIL BHP Billiton 338.21 722479.2824 41.91238773
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          EXX Exxaro Resources 140.5 50283.59207 1.050136613
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          GFI Gold Fields 38.9 29973.14701 1.738798869
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          HAR Harmony 30.81 13410.18603 0.669037189
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          IMP Impala Platinum Hlds 112.62 71051.87061 3.379919633
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          LON Lonmin PLC 45.3 25647.23369 1.130761795
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          NHM Northam Platinum 45.64 18145.82915 0.915826224
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          PAN Pan African Resource 2.46 4496.627267 0.219120586
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          RBP Royal Bafokeng Platinum 73.79 13157.22741 0.228982684
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          SGL Sibanye Gold 24.88 18150.13744 1.052923754
J258 SA Resources 17 1,723,784,593,240          SOL Sasol 638.62 411108.1228 20.27178487
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